Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games

M.A.L. Koster

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages25
Volume1999-107
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-107

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Convex Games
TU Game
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Class

Keywords

  • Cooperative game theory
  • inequality
  • egalitarianism
  • Lorenz-ordering
  • core

Cite this

Koster, M. A. L. (1999). Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-107). Tilburg: Operations research.
Koster, M.A.L. / Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games. Tilburg : Operations research, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Koster, MAL 1999 'Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1999-107, Operations research, Tilburg.

Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games. / Koster, M.A.L.

Tilburg : Operations research, 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-107).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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KW - egalitarianism

KW - Lorenz-ordering

KW - core

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Koster MAL. Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games. Tilburg: Operations research. 1999. (CentER Discussion Paper).