What Determines the Financing Decision in Corporate Takeovers: Cost of Capital, Agency Problems or the Means of Payment?

M. Martynova, L.D.R. Renneboog

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Abstract

While the means of payment in takeovers has been a focal point in the takeover literature, what has largely been ignored is the analysis of how the takeover bid is financed and what its impact is on the expected value creation of the takeover. This paper investigates the sources of transaction financing in European corporate takeovers launched during the period 1993- 2001 (the fifth takeover wave). Using a unique dataset, we show that the external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are quite distinct. For instance, a significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover is not unique to the equity-paid M&As; it is also observed in any other deals that involve equity financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid M&As). Also, acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with debt. Our multinomial logit and nested logit analyses show that the takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder’s pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. There is also evidence that the choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing is influenced by the bidder’s strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment. We find no evidence of financing decisions driven by agency conflicts between managers and shareholders or between shareholders and creditors.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Number of pages45
Volume2008-66
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-66

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Cost of capital
Payment
Financing decisions
Agency problems
Corporate takeovers
Cash
Equity
Equity financing
Debt financing
Shareholders
Governance environment
Announcement
Financing
Corporate governance
Takeover bids
Managers
Multinomial logit
Value creation
Debt
Expected value

Keywords

  • mergers and acquisitions
  • takeovers
  • means of payment
  • financing decision
  • cost of capital
  • agency problem
  • pecking order
  • corporate governance regulation
  • nested logit

Cite this

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What Determines the Financing Decision in Corporate Takeovers : Cost of Capital, Agency Problems or the Means of Payment? / Martynova, M.; Renneboog, L.D.R.

Tilburg : Finance, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-66).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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