Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)

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Abstract

We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead to fully e¢ cient contributions. Words can be as influential as actions, and thus elicit the uninformed player's contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we find that words can be as influential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the returns.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages36
Volume2010-33
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2010-33

Fingerprint

Experiment
Language
Free-riding
Private information

Keywords

  • Information transmission
  • costly signaling
  • communication
  • experiment

Cite this

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title = "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)",
abstract = "We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead to fully e¢ cient contributions. Words can be as influential as actions, and thus elicit the uninformed player's contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we find that words can be as influential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the returns.",
keywords = "Information transmission, costly signaling, communication, experiment",
author = "{Serra Garcia}, M. and {van Damme}, E.E.C. and J.J.M. Potters",
note = "Pagination: 36",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
volume = "2010-33",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
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Serra Garcia, M, van Damme, EEC & Potters, JJM 2010 'Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2010-33, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139). / Serra Garcia, M.; van Damme, E.E.C.; Potters, J.J.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2010. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-33).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)

AU - Serra Garcia, M.

AU - van Damme, E.E.C.

AU - Potters, J.J.M.

N1 - Pagination: 36

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead to fully e¢ cient contributions. Words can be as influential as actions, and thus elicit the uninformed player's contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we find that words can be as influential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the returns.

AB - We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or about her contribution decision. Theoretically, actions lead to fully e¢ cient contributions. Words can be as influential as actions, and thus elicit the uninformed player's contribution, but allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, we find that words can be as influential as actions. Free-riding, however, does depend on the language: the informed player free-rides less when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the returns.

KW - Information transmission

KW - costly signaling

KW - communication

KW - experiment

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2010-33

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -