Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?

J. Boone, J.C. van Ours

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a \spike" in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers' behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters. End-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. We use a dataset on Slovenian unemployment spells to test this prediction and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the spike in the job finding rate suggests that workers exploit unemployment insurance benefits for subsidized leisure.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages41
Volume2009-84
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2009-84

Fingerprint

Exhaustion
Workers
Unemployment
Leisure
Prediction
Unemployment insurance
Employers
Duration of unemployment
Unemployment benefits

Keywords

  • unemployment benefits
  • spikes

Cite this

Boone, J., & van Ours, J. C. (2009). Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-84). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Boone, J. ; van Ours, J.C. / Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Boone, J & van Ours, JC 2009 'Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion?' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2009-84, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? / Boone, J.; van Ours, J.C.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-84).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Boone J, van Ours JC. Why is There a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit Exhaustion? Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).