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Workers’ rights to interfere with the appointment of company directors

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In the Dutch model of worker representation, there are several possibilities for works councils to interfere with the appointment of company directors. The most far-reaching, if certain criteria are met, is the right for works councils in large companies to recommend the appointment of up to one-third of supervisory or non-executive directors. This is potentially an important tool, even though “their” board members do not have the formal role of articulating works council interests within the board. In addition, Dutch works councils have rights to influence the decision about the appointment of directors in the general meeting of shareholders. They also have the right to be consulted in the appointment of directors in the company's affiliated business. Whether and how this ability to interfere with the appointment of directors affects the running of the company depends on the real use of the rights granted to works councils. Moreover, the territorial scope places limits on the impact of the Dutch model in international groups.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStakeholder engagement in European companies
EditorsHanne Birkmose, Karsten Engsig Sørensen
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Chapter4
Pages63-83
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9781035356829
ISBN (Print)9781035356812
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Dec 2025

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth
    SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
  2. SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
    SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

  • appointment company directors
  • worker representation

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