WTO law and economics and restrictive practices in energy trade

The case of the OPEC cartel

Anna Marhold

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    Abstract

    The World Trade Organization cannot deal comprehensively with restrictive export practices maintained by energy cartels such as the OPEC. The main reason for this is the absence of competition rules in the multilateral trading system. However, in spite of the fact that the WTO does not have rules on competition, it does provide for other rules, such as GATT Article XI on the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions. This article will take a law and economics approach and explore whether restrictive practices in the energy sector as maintained by OPEC could be caught by this article. It will analyse whether OPEC’s ‘monopolist market power instrument of choice’, namely the administration of production quota on petroleum, could fall within the definition of this Article. To this end, this contribution aims to understand the economic and legal rationales and functioning of both the WTO and OPEC.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)475-494
    Number of pages32
    JournalJournal of World Energy Law & Business
    Volume9
    Issue number6
    Publication statusPublished - 27 Dec 2016

    Fingerprint

    OPEC
    cartel
    WTO
    energy
    Economics
    Law
    economics
    rules of competition
    Crude oil
    GATT
    World Trade Organization
    economic approach
    market power
    bycatch
    petroleum
    market

    Cite this

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    WTO law and economics and restrictive practices in energy trade : The case of the OPEC cartel. / Marhold, Anna.

    In: Journal of World Energy Law & Business , Vol. 9, No. 6, 27.12.2016, p. 475-494.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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